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Financial Apex Organizations: Experiences From Mexico1 
Mario Villalpando-Benitez and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega2 
I. Introduction 
The Mexican case is rich in experiences about the effects of government intervention in 
financial markets. The Mexican Federal Government, in particular, has made extensive use of a 
number of instruments to supply targeted and subsidized credit for economic activities labeled as "of 
national interest." 
The history of government intervention in financial markets begins right after the end of the 
Mexican Revolution. In the early 1930s, the Government began to create state-owned national banks 
as a means of promoting the development of specific sectors of economic activity. In less than ten 
years, seven state-owned banks were established. Among them, Nacional Financiera (NAFIN) and 
Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior (BANCOMEXT) are still in operation, and their importance 
has not diminished over the years. 
During the so-called Stabilizing Development Period (from the early 1940s through the late 
1960s ), the menu of government instruments to spur economic development through the financial 
system was extended further to include reserve requirements on bank deposits, ceilings on the 
interest rates charged on specific bank loans, and the creation of a broad set of trust or credit 
guarantee funds for the promotion of particular types of economic activities (Fondos). 
In particular, reserve requirements were used by the Mexican authorities less as instruments 
of monetary policy and more as planning tools to influence the allocation of credit. Thus, reserve 
requirements were lowered when the funds mobilized by the banks were channeled to priority 
activities. In tum, the apex organizations known as Fondos were established to promote specific 
projects and/or particular sectors and clienteles. In contrast to the activities of the state-owned banks, 
the operations of the Fondos have taken place at the second-tier level through the discount of 
private-bank loans (Vasquez, 1993). 
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Promotion of the microenterprise sector took the back seat in the development of the 
Mexican banking system. Emphasis was placed on employment-creation, so most directed credit 
programs attempted to spur the growth of medium-size and large firms. 
As an exception, for over thirty years, the Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Industry 
(Fondo de Garantla para la Pequena y Mediana Industria - FOGAIN), a government-established 
financial apex, directed some credit toward small and microenterprises. The effects of FOGAIN on 
these sectors, however, seem to have been marginal. The aggregate data on the operations of this 
apex mechanism show a bias in favor of medium-size businesses operating in the manufacturing 
sector (Ramirez, 1985). 
Recently, nevertheless, the microenterprise sector has been accorded a special place in the 
plans and policies of the Mexican Government. Two factors explain this recent behavior. First, the 
potential of microenterprises in creating employment opportunities has been recognized. A number 
of sample surveys have shown that about two-thirds of total employment in Mexico are generated 
by microenterprises (Ruiz, 1995). 
Second, the average funding requirements of a firm in the microenterprise sector are typically 
lower than those of a large firm. This is particularly important, given the current situation of public 
finances in Mexico. The dearth of fiscal resources has compelled the Government to close down 
some promotion and guarantee funds and to begin a reorganization of the development banking 
system. When the availability of resources is sharply limited, a larger number of firms can be 
reached if they demand smaller loans. 
The new emphasis placed by the authorities on the microenterprise sector has led to the 
design of two programs targeted to promoting it. One of them consists of an apex mechanism to be 
run by NAFIN. The main objective of this mechanism will be to strengthen non-government (NGO) 
microfinance organizations. An initial pilot program will be implemented in early 1998. This 
program will be described below. 
The second program to promote the microenterprise sector is being structured by the Central 
Bank (Banco de Mexico) and by World Bank officials. In contrast to the NAFIN apex, this program 
will have as its main objective to induce private banks to establish new branches in small towns. This 
program will also be described below. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the historical 
evolution of the Mexican development banking system. This section contains, as well, a brief review 
of the main justifications for government intervention in the allocation of credit offered by the 
authorities. Section III provides a profiles of existing microfinance organizations. The main objective 
of this section is to identify the size of the microfinance market in Mexico. Section IV describes 
some second-tier financial organizations that have operated in Mexico, and it derives lessons from 
their experience. Section V discusses the two new microfinance programs sponsored by the 
Government. Some conclusions complete the paper. 
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II. The Mexican Development Banking System 
The consolidation of the current development banking system in Mexico can be dated to the 
1950s and 1960s. At that time, the financial authorities argued a number of reasons to support the 
creation of new state-owned development banks and of several promotion or guarantee funds and 
the design of mechanisms to allocate credit to areas labeled as critical for economic development, 
such as agriculture and manufacturing. Selective credit instruments and loan interest-rate controls 
were adopted as key mechanisms to achieve these goals. 
Justifications for intervention in financial markets 
Two main arguments have been used in Mexico to justify government intervention in the 
financial sector. 3 First, policymakers have highlighted the dearth of information among private banks 
about non-commercial activities. Policymakers believe that private banks have been reluctant to 
allocate enough credit to agriculture and industry because bank managers have wrong perceptions 
about levels of risk in these sectors of economic activity. These perceptions may in part reflect that 
bankers tend to evaluate potential borrowers on a short-term basis while most agricultural and 
industrial projects are profitable only in the long-run. 
According to this reasoning, the state has an important role in addressing the myopic 
behavior of private banks. On the one hand, there is a direct role for government through the 
operation of state-owned banks. On the other hand, the risks associated with loans for development 
projects can be indirectly shared with the private banks through the operation of second-tier organi-
zations such as guarantee funds (Fondos). 
Presumably, the availability of credit for new firms in agriculture and industry generates 
positive externalities for the overall economic system. This has been the second justification in favor 
of the creation of the development banking system. Solis (1961), who is one of the major intellectual 
forces behind the Stabilizing Development Period (1940-1960), claims that, to be able to promote 
economic development, the state has to share the start-up risks of new manufacturing and agri-
cultural firms. This author argues that after an initial period, the new firms will generate sufficient 
expected profits to compensate for the subsidy. 
Based on these theoretical arguments and frequently based on political and rent-seeking 
pressures, the Mexican authorities have established an extensive development banking system. 
3 These arguments are presented here only to describe the ideological environment that led to 
the creation of financial apex organizations. It is not the objective of this paper to evaluate 
the validity of these arguments. 
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Structure of the development banking system 
The development banking system of Mexico has been structured at three levels. At the first 
level, the state-owned development banks offer access to credit to selected firms for their initial 
funding and for their working capital. The leading orientation of the development banking system 
has been to support the expansion of the industrial sector. Currently, there are seven state-owned 
national banks. The most important are the Nacional Financiera (NAFIN), Banco Nacional de 
Comercio Exterior (BANCOMEXI'), Banco Nacional de Credito Rural (BANRURAL), and Banco 
Nacional de Obras y Servicios Publicos (BANOBRAS). 
At the second level, before 1988 the Central Bank required minimum legal reserve 
requirements on the total liabilities of the private banks, and it established rules on the interest rates 
to be charged by the banks on loans to agriculture, manufacturing, and foreign trade activities. These 
tools of financial repression were eliminated with the liberalizing financial reforms of the late 1980s. 
At the third level, 13 promotion or guarantee funds operate as second-tier apex organizations 
to discount bank loans for special projects and/or specific clienteles. The most important promotion 
funds are the apex mechanisms related to the promotion of agriculture (FIRA), the promotion of 
exports of manufactured goods (FOMEX), the financing of popular housing (FOVI), and the 
promotion of the small and medium-size business sector (NAFIN-FOGAIN). 
Deep structural changes took place in the Mexican economy during the 1980s. The public 
sector was downsized, most of the state-owned enterprises were sold to the private sector, and 
government intervention in the economy was limited to areas identified with the national interest 
(Gil Diaz, 1992). These measures were a response to the scarcity of fiscal funds, a result of the costs 
of servicing the large foreign public debt, which had reached the upper limit of the payment capacity 
of the Mexican Government. Furthermore, since 1985 the economy has been increasingly opened 
to international competition. Most of the earlier quantitative controls on trade have been replaced 
by comparatively low import tariffs, and major laws have been modified to allow the participation 
of foreign direct investment in a larger number of sectors of economic activity (Noyola, 1993 ). 
The scarcity of public funds and the reorganization of the Federal Government have affected 
both the size and the operation of the development banking system. The scarcity of fiscal funds has 
constrained the outreach of the state-owned banks and of the promotion funds. For instance, in the 
two years following the critical period around 1982, the resources available to finance agriculture 
fell almost by 30 percent.4 To face this situation, the development banking system was reorganized. 
Some of the major changes introduced have included a merging of all the promotion funds related 
to the industrial sector into one and the liquidation of several other funds. 
4 In 1982, the Mexican public finances were in a critical situation. The available fiscal funds 
were insufficient to cover the service of the public debt, and the Finance Minister requested 
a debt rescheduling from the main foreign creditors. 
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Financial apex organizations have played an important role in the evolution of the Mexican 
development banking system. This role continued to be important during the De la Madrid (1982-
1988), Salinas (1988-1994 ), and Zedillo ( 1994-2000) administrations, when government intervention 
in the financial system has been redefined. Indeed, apex organizations have been chosen as the main 
instruments of public action in credit markets, while the retailing role of the state-owned banks has 
been minimized. 
For this purpose, most of the earlier promotion funds have been plugged into the programs 
of the state-owned banks, whose main operations are now expected to take place at the wholesale 
level. The apex organizations for industry, for instance, have been appended to NAFIN. At the same 
time, the direct retailing participation of the state-owned banks has been restricted to cases where 
the private commercial banks are still reluctant to step in. In this new environment, low-income 
peasants and microentrepreneurs have been included among the main target groups of the 
development banking system. 
III. The Microfinance Sector 
For a long time, the microenterprise sector had been neglected by the Mexican formal 
financial system. A number of factors explain this situation. First, most small and microenterprises 
have been unable to fulfill the eligibility criteria for a bank loan. Microenterprises, in particular, have 
been unable to offer the collateral required by formal credit contracts. 
Second, the transaction costs incurred both by the bank and by the potential borrower in the 
process of determination of the borrower's creditworthiness are extremely high compared to the size 
of the loan. This makes loans unprofitable for the bank and expensive for the borrower. 
The small and microenterprise sectors had been relegated, as well, to a second place in the 
programs of the state-owned development banking system. The priority in these programs had until 
recently been the promotion of large enterprises in the industrial sector. For this reason, small and 
microenterprises were unable to access the subsidized credit offered by these government programs. 
Both the reluctance of private banks and the low level of interest of the development banks 
opened the opportunity for some private financial organizations to respond in part to the demands 
of the small and microenterprise sector. This semi-formal microfinance sector is composed of credit 
cooperatives, savings and loan societies, credit unions, solidarity credit cooperatives, and some non-
government organizations and charity organizations. 
The study of the Mexican microfinance sector is difficult due to a dearth of information. 
There is not, for example, a comprehensive inventory ofmicrofinance organizations in the country. 
The information available, however, reveals an unfavorable situation for the sector. 
5 
Credit cooperative organizations 
It is estimated that there are at least 300 credit cooperatives (cajas or cooperativas de ahorro 
y credito) in Mexico, a comparatively small number for such a large country. Caja Popular Mexi-
cana, which is the largest conglomerate of this kind of organizations, includes almost one-half of 
the total (120 cooperatives). This confederation associates over 300,000 members. The principal 
areas of influence of these credit cooperatives are the central and southeastern regions of the country. 
There are, as well, a number of independent cooperative organizations dispersed across the country. 
It is difficult to figure out both the exact number of these cooperatives and their importance, but it 
is known that most of them have a short life (Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, 1993). 
A common set of principles governs the operations of cooperative organizations. The most 
important of these principles are: 
(a) free membership, 
(b) one-person, one-vote, 
( c) no returns on capital, and 
( d) the use of profits for social purposes. 
Chaves (1994) has shown that these principles impose strong constraints on the potential 
growth capacity of cooperatives. Free membership, together with insufficient portfolio diversifica-
tion, for instance, introduce uncertainty in the organization, so that any moderate or sharp economic 
fluctuation in the region can lead to a massive exodus of members. The second principle, one-person, 
one-vote, induces internal control problems. The collective action of a majority of members can bias 
the allocation of credit at favorable terms toward specific groups of borrowers in detriment of 
depositors. 
The third and fourth cooperative principles, no returns on capital and the use of profits for 
social purposes, also constrain the potential growth of these organizations. In particular, the board 
of directors and/or managers have no incentives to pursue expansion plans because the profit motive 
is absent. Furthermore, the requirement to use yearly profits in social projects may lead to the 
opportunistic behavior of managers. In effect, managers are likely to spend these profits in projects 
related to their personal satisfaction. 
The behavior of the Mexican credit cooperatives fits theoretical predictions about these 
financial organizations. Cooperatives members of the Caja Popular Mexicana (CPM) can be chosen 
as representative examples of the overall movement. Indeed, threats to the stability of the CPM have 
long been a main concern for its managers. For example, the membership of the largest federation 
among the members ofCPM (COECILLO) shows an unstable behavior. In only one year (1993), 
changes in the membership of the credit cooperatives in this federation varied within an ample range: 
from -15 to 33 percent (Caja Popular Mexicana, 1993). 
6 
A high level of non-performing loans is another key concern regarding the CPM. In 1993, 
almost 20 percent of COECILLO's members defaulted in the payment of their loans and were ousted 
from the cooperatives. Even more, arrears constituted more than 20 percent of the total loan 
portfolio. 
The absence of a formal framework (legal status) for credit cooperatives is a factor that 
complicates even more the situation of these organizations. In Mexico, the legal framework only 
allows the operation of consumption or production cooperatives but not of financial cooperatives. 
Savings and loan cooperatives have bypassed this legal vacuum by adopting the status of civil 
organizations. This solution, however, has raised serious restrictions on the development of credit 
cooperative organizations. One the one hand, these organizations have not been able to extend their 
financial services beyond loans tied to member shares and savings deposits. They have not mobilized 
deposits from the public. On the other hand, these financial transactions are based only on a good-
faith agreement between the member and the board of directors or the cooperative's manager. 
The lack of an appropriate legal status introduces a critical moral hazard problem in the 
relationship between the members and the managers of a credit cooperative. To allow the completion 
of deposit and loan transactions and to prosecute :fraudulent acts, the managers are endowed with the 
legal ownership of the assets of the association. Quite a few crooks have taken advantage of this 
opportunity to create phony credit cooperatives and then run away with the deposits. 
The credit cooperatives, mainly the Caja Popular Mexicana, have requested the financial 
authorities that their organizations be included in the formal financial system. The authorities have 
rejected this petition arguing that the stability of the aggregate finan~ial system can be negatively 
affected by the inclusion of credit cooperatives in the set of regulated financial institutions. To 
justify their decision, the authorities point to the erratic behavior of these organizations. 
Moreover, the sustainability of the credit cooperatives seems to be directly linked to the good 
faith of the board of directors and managers. This means that most of the credit cooperatives would 
require a close and detailed monitoring of their operations by a regulatory board. The prudential 
regulation of credit cooperatives, however, is even harder than for banks due to the large number of 
small organizations dispersed along the country and the broader set of risks that threaten their 
sustainability. 
Savings and loan societies 
In 1993, the class of savings and loan societies (sociedad de ahorro y prestamo or SAP) was 
added to the group of formal financial institutions. According to the decree, the structure of a SAP 
corresponds closely to the description of a credit cooperative. A SAP is defined as a non-profit 
organization with open membership. Its functions are constrained to managing savings deposits and 
loans to its members. The cooperative principles of one-person, one-vote and the use of any 
economic surplus to accumulate capital or to finance community projects are also effective for the 
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SAPs. The SAPs are thus vulnerable to the same threats from weak property and governance 
structures as credit cooperatives are. 
The first SAP to be authorized was the Caja Mexicana de Fomento (CANAFO). The 
outreach of CANAFO seems impressive. In the first two years, its membership reached more than 
70,000 members in 98 branches (Boutielle, 1993). The demand for authorization by many other 
financial organizations that want to become SAPs has been strong. During the year when the decree 
was issued, more than 120 organizations requested the SAP charter. 
The process of authorization has been, however, slow and difficult for the large number of 
financial organizations that are looking forward to become SAPs. The weak financial situation of 
most of them has been the principal obstacle. Less than one-fifth of the credit cooperatives that 
constitute Caja Popular Mexicana, for instance, fulfill the minimum standard requirements of a 
healthy financial institution and therefore cannot be converted into SAPs (Caja Popular Mexicana, 
1993). Table 1 shows selected data on the credit cooperatives that had requested a SAP charter 
through 1995. 
Credit unions 
The credit union charter (union de credito) has formally existed since 1932. The original 
purpose of this type of financial organization was to form syndicates of individual producers and/or 
small firms to reap the benefits of subsidized credit. The behavior of the credit union movement has 
been erratic. Due to a high degree of opportunistic behavior, credit unions are usually short-lived. 
It is common practice of credit union members to request long-term loans from state-owned banks 
and then fall in default in their obligations. 
The incentive for a credit union member to get behind in his loan repayment obligations rests 
on two factors. First, credit unions lack a true owner, and the obligations of their members are 
restricted to their initial contributions, which are an insignificant proportion of their outstanding 
loans. Second, the policy followed by the financial authorities has been to forgive the overdue debts 
of credit unions. 
Thus, in practice, rent-seeking credit unions have been an instrument of pressure groups to 
access the benefits of cheap or even free fiscal resources. Credit has been viewed by government 
officials just as another subsidy instrument, not as a financial contractual relationship. 
The 1990-94 period was a golden age for the credit union movement. The administration in 
power decided to substantially increase the amount of fiscal resources available to credit unions. This 
decision was partially founded on the assumption that credit union members typically are entre-
preneurs relegated from access to the formal financial system. As Table 2 shows, during this period 
NAFIN increased the amount of resources disbursed through credit unions by more than 60 times. 
The growth of this type of financial intermediaries can be described as explosive. In six years, the 
number of credit unions funded by NAFIN increased six-fold. 
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Table 1. Credit cooperatives that had requested a SAP charter by 1995 
(units and thousands of U.S. dollars*) 
State Members Number of Assets Loans Savings 
cooperatives deposits 
Baja California 160 1 646 606 598 
Colima 7,575 5 3,766 2,978 2,869 
Chihuahua 60,609 6 12,479 7,224 9,122 
Mexico City 11,110 7 9,953 3,633 3,002 
Durango 15,884 2 14,983 12,421 13,445 
Guanajuato 18,373 8 9,804 7,068 10,400 
Hidalgo 20,573 3 21,364 17,324 16,933 
Jalisco 123,930 31 87,718 53,445 50,713 
State of Mexico 5,075 5 105,029 76,211 105,909 
Michoacan 2,573 2 1,050 985 943 
Nayarit 1,985 1 1,026 173 782 
Nuevo Leon 1,847 1 616 446 417 
Oaxaca 2,919 1 1,526 1,282 1,309 
Puebla 1,259 1 931 746 647 
Queretaro 237,738 25 379,087 322,052 354,231 
San Luis 391,624 13 262,640 219,649 199,808 
Sinaloa 8,677 5 4,652 3,492 3,200 
Sonora 1,000 1 441 0 0 
Tabasco 1,500 1 1,548 1,366 854 
Tamaulipas 4,502 1 311 183 231 
Veracruz 3,084 1 2,263 1,843 1,638 
Yucatan 24,565 5 15,063 12,015 10,513 
Zacatecas 4,474 2 4,234 1,080 3,263 
Total 951,036 128 941,130 746,222 790,827 
*Exchange rate: 3.30 pesos per U.S. dollar. 
Source: Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico. 
The political decision to increase the number of credit unions, combined with the inability 
of the regulatory entities to supervise each and all organizations, has created numerous headaches 
for the financial authorities. Several credit unions have been intervened by the National Banking 
Commission (Comisi6n Nacional Bancaria) due to non-performing portfolios. Even more, several 
cases of fraud have been brought to public attention, such as the case of the Union de Credito Valle 
de Mexico. Currently, a trial is in process for the fraud presumably committed by the managers of 
UNICREVA. The amount of the fraud is more than US$240 million. 
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Table 2. NAFIN: Affiliated credit unions and amount disbursed through credit 
unions, 1989-1995 (number of units and thousands of Pesos) 
Year Number of Credit Unions 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
n.a. Not Available. 
Source: NAFIN. 
40 
75 
121 
172 
237 
279 
274 
Amount disbursed through credit unions 
43,600 
127,219 
745,425 
2,181,227 
5,675,613 
8,128,587 
n.a. 
Among the universe of credit unions, only the members of the Mexican Association of Credit 
Unions (AMUCSS) can be considered as microfinance organizations. The AMUCSS membership 
is composed of low-income peasants, and most of them can be considered as low-productivity 
entrepreneurs (Mansell, 1995). 
The sources of funds for AMUCSS are varied. They include two state-owned banks and one 
promotion fund, namely BANRURAL, NAFIN, and FIRA. Other sources of funds are the Ford 
Foundation and the Interamerican Foundation. The initial capital and the growth of the social capital 
of the credit unions affiliated with AMUCSS come from the issuing of participation shares in small 
par values. 
The financial health of the AMUCSS affiliates is poor. As Table 3 shows, the non-
performing loan portfolio varies along a range of 11 to 87 percent of the total portfolio. The average 
loan portfolio in arrears is 19 percent. These figures indicate that credit unions are an extremely 
inefficient instrument to disburse funds to the microenterprise sector. 
Solidaridad credit cooperatives 
The national anti-poverty program (Programa Nacional de Solidaridad) of the Salinas 
administration had a deep impact on the Mexican development strategy. Initially, Solidaridad was 
designed as a way to cope with the adverse effects of export-led development on workers located 
in unproductive sectors of the economy. For this purpose, most of the formerly independent social 
programs, which were dispersed among several government bureaus, were merged into Solidaridad. 
The Ministry of Social Development was created to manage these resources. The current Zedillo 
administration has kept the main structure of So/idaridad. It has renamed, however, some of its main 
components, and the word Solidaridadhas been deleted from the government's vocabulary. 
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Table 3. AMUCSS credit unions: Selected financial indicators, 1989-1995. (Accumulated 
amounts in pesos) 
State Total Total Repayment Loans not Loans Arrears 
disbursements Repayments Ratea due overdue rateb 
Sonora 447,756 338,658 75.6 44,085 65,013 14.5 
Sinaloa 14,353 11,557 80.5 18 2,778 19.4 
Chihuahua 24,687 15,582 63.1 3,584 5,521 22.4 
Durango 15,627 10,297 65.9 2,364 2,966 19.0 
Zacatecas 147,377 53,900 36.6 45,270 48,207 32.7 
Nayarit 16,164 14,098 87.2 2,025 41 0.3 
Jalisco 11,781 7,930 67.3 3,743 108 0.9 
Guanajuato 495 209 42.2 0 286 57.8 
Mexico 17,050 9,756 57.2 1,244 6,050 35.5 
Hidalgo 4,839 2,534 52.4 1,982 323 6.7 
Puebla 101,478 32,208 31.7 39,398 29,872 29.4 
Morelos 13,017 7,939 61.0 2,215 2,863 22.0 
Guerrero 10,065 5,793 57.6 975 3,297 32.8 
Veracruz 63,422 43,798 69.1 10,756 11,658 18.4 
Oaxaca 32,499 3,560 11.0 28,939 0 0.0 
Chiapas 13,536 6,451 47.7 5,333 1,752 n.a. 
Total 934,146 564,270 60.4 191,931 180,735 19.4 
a Repayments as a percentage of total disbursements. 
b Arrears as a percentage of total accumulated loan portfolio. 
Source: AMUCSS, 1997. 
The Solidaridad credit cooperatives are one of the components of the financial side of the 
Solidarity Program. The initial capital of these cooperatives came from the loan repayments of the 
"credit on one's word" program (credito a la palabra). As its name indicates, the credit-on-one's-
word program was designed to offer loans to the poorest peasants, who harvest beans and com in 
low-productivity lands, without collateral requirements. 
Among the functions of the Solidarity Enterprises National Fund, a decentralized government 
agency, are to promote, monitor, and supervise the behavior of the Solidaridad cooperatives. The 
Canadian cooperative organization Developpement International Desjardins has provided the 
technological design ohhis type of cooperative. The Solidaridad cooperative is governed by the 
general assembly and a board of directors. The policies related to savings and loan activities are set 
by the general assembly. Loan and deposit interest rates, for instance, are set by majority vote in the 
general assembly. 
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Table 4 presents selected data on the Solidaridad credit cooperatives. Although aggregate 
financial data do not capture the heterogeneity of the performance of these cooperatives, the figures 
about arrears and liquidity may indicate future problems. In particular, the loan portfolio in arrears 
increased from 4.4 percent in 1994 to 17.4 percent in 1996. These are threatening signs but not 
unexpected results given the political origin of the system. 
Table 4. Solidaridad credit cooperatives: selected financial indicators 
(percentages) 
Financial ratios Dec. '94 Dec. '95 Dec. '96 
Liquidity I Assets 47.1 45.8 43.2 
Short-run liquiditya 19.6 13.1 7.5 
Savings/ Assets 4.7 6.1 10.8 
Loans/ Assets 46.9 43.1 42.8 
Arrears 4.4 12.8 17.4 
Capital/ Assets 91.2 85.7 81.4 
Leverageb 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Return on Capital 6.3 19.0 17.0 
Net Income/ Assets 5.7 16.3 13.8 
a Reserves/Short-run debt. 
b Liabilities/Capital. 
Source: FONAES, 1996. 
Although it may be too early for a precise evaluation of the Solidaridad cooperatives, it is 
appropriate to recognize a number of issues. First, the cooperative structure has numerous flaws 
which limit its usefulness as an efficient financial institution. Second, government-led programs 
usually introduce rent-seeking behavior by the clientele of financial organizations which threatens 
loan repayment. Finally, political intervention in general introduces severe doubts regarding the 
sustainability of financial organizations. The enduring of the Solidarity Program, for example, has 
relied on the mood of the politicians in power. 
Recent micro.finance innovations 
Some commercial banks and retailing chain stores have recently entered the microfinance 
business. Two factors explain this behavior. First, the recent openness with respect to the supply of 
financial services by foreign intermediaries has created a new competitive environment in the 
banking system. The entry of both foreign banks and brokerage houses in the market constitutes a 
threat to the market share of Mexican banks, particularly for the banks specialized in the attention 
of corporate clients. Furthermore, some foreign banks have made attempts to attract the savings of 
middle-income households. For this purpose, several foreign banks have acquired Mexican banks 
so that they can take advantage of the branching infrastructure of these banks. 
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Several medium-size Mexican banks have faced this new competitive environment by 
downscaling their services to reach both a popular clientele and microenterprises. Two examples are 
BITAL and BANCRECER. The latter has been a pioneer in the strategy of setting up numerous 
small branches. At the beginning, BANCRECER constrained the expansion of this network to cities 
located in the central region of the country. Its main focus of attention was to respond to the financial 
demands of small shoemakers in Leon, Guanajuato. This task has been approached by opening 
branches inside the markets where the shoemakers and their suppliers engage in their transactions. 
The BANCRECER branches are usually staffed by one or two tellers, with a front desk and a pair 
of waiting chairs.5 
BIT AL is another remarkable example of the emerging microfinance sector in Mexico. 
BIT AL has followed the strategy of adapting traditional savings schemes to a formal setting. The 
tanda, one of the Mexican terms for rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA), is one of the 
products that BITAL has offered to the low-income population. BITAL has introduced, moreover, 
some improvements in this product. In contrast to the informal variety, the BITAL tanda allows the 
customer to set the amount to be deposited each month and the term to maturity of the contract. The 
minimum deposit and term are US$ 12 and six months, respectively. Another characteristic of this 
savings formula is that the bank pays an attractive interest rate on the deposits. The tanda members 
are also included in lotteries where they can win from 2 to 20 times their monthly deposit. 
BIT AL provides the depositor with life insurance and with the chance to get a personal loan. 
To be eligible for a personal loan, the client is required to have the direct deposit of his/her monthly 
wages. At the beginning, the amount of the loan is one-and-a-halftimes the individual's monthly 
wage. The term of the loan is six months, and a nominal monthly interest rate of 6 percent is 
charged.6 
The considerable amount of money transfers of immigrant Mexican workers is the second 
factor that explains the recent interest in microfinance. Several commercial banks, retailing chain 
stores, and postal and telegraph companies have made efforts to attract a share of the six billion U.S. 
dollars that Mexican workers send their families each year (Business Week, 5/12/97). 
So far, the service provided by banks has been limited to just the transfer of funds mainly 
from the U.S. to Mexico. Three of the largest Mexican banks (BANAMEX, BANCOMER, and 
SERFIN) have signed contracts with U.S. telegraph companies, such as Western Union and 
5 
6 
This development has paralleled the operation of small bank branches in supermarkets in the 
United States. Moreover, BANCRECER has transferred this technology to its subsidiaries 
in other countries such as Costa Rica. 
The average monthly inflation rate was 1.3 percent in 1997. Thus, BIT AL' s loan interest rate 
was equal to 4. 7 percent per month. 
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MoneyGram Payment Systems, to make electronic transfers of money. The cost of the transfer, 
however, is still considerable. 
Non-financial intermediaries, such as Elektra (an appliance retail chain store), have also 
offered the service of transfer of funds. Elektra, in particular, has had an important impact in low-
income areas, small cities, and rural areas. This is due to the large number of chain stores located 
across the country. 
The recent emergence of the microfinance sector in Mexico seems to be the result of an 
upward shift of the demand for financial services. In response, financial intermediaries not only 
have increased the supply of traditional services, but they have also adopted technological 
improvements to face the higher demand. All of these innovations and adaptations have emerged 
with no intervention of the state and no role for an apex organization. 
The government, however, has not been outside of the new microfinance scenario. Since 
1988, the National Savings Bond Program (Patronato del Ahorro Nacional) has set up branches in 
the postal offices located mainly in rural zones. Government officials have extolled this program 
arguing its remarkable savings mobilization success (Werner, 1997). 
Altruistic organizations 
Many NGOs were born after the earthquake that shattered Mexico City in 1985. Some of 
these NGOs were created to meet the immediate needs of the affected population, such as the 
provision of shelter, food, and health care. Other NGOs were established to help address the negative 
effects of the earthquake on the level of economic activity. Some NGOs, for instance, started 
programs to generate employment and offer small loans to the population in the affected areas. This 
active role ofNGOs in the promotion of economic activities has been remarkable because before this 
natural disaster their functions were constrained to charity. 
The birth of a handful ofmicrofinance NGOs can also be dated back to 1985. Among them, 
Emprendedores, CAME, and Compartamos stand out because of their comparative financial success. 
Initially, these organizations were programs of altruistic institutions designed to transfer financial 
resources to microentrepreneurs. Their initial sources of funds were grants by some large 
corporations. Later on, due to the financial stability and outreach of these programs, some 
international donors (World Bank, IDB, and Ford Foundation, among others) granted them 
substantial amounts of funds so they could increase their operations. 
The target population of Emprendedores is found in some of the poorest areas of Mexico 
City. The main objective of this NGO is to create and consolidate jobs by means of individual loans 
to microentrepreneurs. Loans are granted on the basis of creditworthiness. The potential borrowers 
must operate a stable business. Also, either they must have the endorsement of one or more members 
of their community who certify that they are good borrowers or they must provide collateral to back 
the loan. Emprendedores charges loan interest rates that reflect the cost of the funds. An additional 
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requirement is that the wealth of the potential borrower must be less than 15 yearly minimum wages 
(around US$1,300, given an exchange rate of 8.30 pesos per US dollar). 
Emprendedores seems to have reached a small but stable level of operations. In 1996 and 
1997, for instance, the total number of loans granted was 888 and 809, respectively. This 
organization in 1997 reached just 64 more borrowers than the 384 borrowers reached in 1996. The 
ratio of the non-performing loan portfolio of Emprendedores is higher than for Compartamos and 
CAME. Non-performing loans were 9.5 and 5.1 percent of the total portfolio in 1996 and 1997, 
respectively. Despite some attractive features, therefore, this NGO contributes little to the expansion 
of microfinance in Mexico. It is an example of numerous other NGOs with extremely low outreach 
and questionable sustainability. 
CAME is another apparently successful microfinance NGO. It was created to reach 
microentrepreneurs in the Chalco area, the poorest of the suburbs of Mexico City. Although CAME 
was originally a program of Emprendedores, it is different in several aspects; in particular, CAME 
has implemented a group-lending technology. It gives an initial loan to a group of 15 individuals 
who offer joint liability for all other group members. The size of loan increases as the group pays 
previous loans. As in Emprendedores, loan interest rates are high enough to cover the cost of funds 
plus administrative expenses. In addition, CAME requires the group to accumulate savings 
equivalent at least to one-third of outstanding loans. This further raises the effective interest rates 
charged. 
Table 5 shows selected indicators for CAME. From 1993 to 1997, the number of borrowers 
increased almost seven times. Both the loan and savings per member are increasing at a similar pace. 
For this reason, the ratio of savings to outstanding loans has been kept around 66 percent, which is 
higher than the minimum savings required by CAME. It is worth noting the almost non-existent non-
performing loan portfolio. In 1995, a critical year for the Mexican economy, non-performing loans 
were just 2.6 percent of the total portfolio. 
Table 5. CAME: Selected financial indicators. 
Indicator 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Number of members 470 1,261 1,693 1,831 3,182 
Loans per member (pesos) 305 452 643 811 1,162 
Savings per member (pesos) n.a. 301 416 571 769 
Savings/loan per member (%) n.a. 67 65 70 66 
Non-Performing loans(%) 0.00 0.00 2.58 0.23 0.01 
Source: CAME. 
Compartamos is a microfinance NGO that has shown an excellent performance. As CAME, 
it employs a group-lending technology. The groups (grupos so/idarios) are formed with an average 
of 31 women, mostly in rural areas. Each member of the group offers joint liability for the others. 
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The loans per member vary along a range of 400 to 5,000 pesos (US$47 to 580). Loans have to be 
paid over a period of 16 weeks, with weekly payments. A monthly interest rate of 5 percent 
(equivalent to a monthly real rate of 3.7 percent) is charged. 
The outreach of Compartamos is impressive. Currently, it is working in some of the poorest 
areas of rural Mexico, such as Chiapas and Oaxaca. The number of members grew almost 85 percent 
in just three years, from 17 ,500 members in 1995 to 32,254 in 1997 (Table 6). So far, the growth 
of Compartamos has been matched by a good financial performance. The non-performing loan 
portfolio was just 2.6 percent in 1997, and the real return on assets went from -26 percent in 1995 
to 10.2 percent in 1997. 
Table 6. COMPARTAMOS: Selected financial indicators 
Indicator 1995 
Number of members 
Number of groups 
Loan per member (pesos) 
Non-Performing loans(%) 
Real annual return on assets (%) 
Source: Compartamos. 
17,500 
514 
239 
0.4 
-26.0 
1996 1997 
26,716 32,254 
906 1,301 
362 481 
1.2 2.6 
-18.8 10.2 
The outreach success of Compartamos is in part linked to its food-work program. This 
program, which began in 1984, consists of a basket of food given to the head of the family in 
exchange for a number of hours of her/his work in the construction of public facilities. Most of the 
initial grupos solidarios were formed with the people already participating in the food-work 
program. The financial success of Compartamos is due to an outstanding management team whose 
goal is long-term sustainability. 
The main funders of Compartamos are private organizations and individuals, as well as 
public institutions such as CGAP, IDB, and BANAMEX. If the growth trend of Compartamos 
continues, its managers are planning on becoming financially self-sufficient by the year 2006. 
Some comments emerge from the analysis of Emprendedores, CAME, and Compartamos. 
First, the history of these NGOs shows that financial sustainability can be achieved without the 
intervention of apex organizations. Moreover, the IDB and the World Bank gave substantial loans 
to these NGOs only after they were along the road of becoming financially independent of their 
initial donors. Second, the three NGOs described here were the result of private initiatives. Neither 
the government nor other public institution had any influence on their creation. Third, 
creditworthiness as a criterion to grant loans is a major ingredient of their medium-term success. 
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IV. Second-Tier Financial Organizations 
Financial apex organizations have a long history in Mexico. Some of the older promotion and 
guarantee funds were created in the 1940s and 1950s. The most outstanding are the set of funds 
related to agricultural activities (FIRA) and those created to promote exports of manufacturing firms 
(FOMEX), to finance investment in popular housing (FOVI), to encourage activities related to 
tourism (INFRATUR), and the Guarantee and Development Fund for Small and Medium Industry 
(FOGAIN). With the exception ofFOGAIN, all of these funds were managed by the Central Bank 
(Banco de Mexico). Among these funds, only FIRA and FOGAIN have indirectly reached the 
microenterprise sector. The analysis is restricted here to the second-tier financial organizations that 
· have had some impact on the small and microenterprise sector.7 
Rationale for creation of the apex organizations 
According to the Mexican authorities, the rationale for the creation of financial apex organi-
zations has rested on two arguments. The first one states that apex organizations avoid the perils of 
direct state intervention in (retailing) credit markets. The experience of the state-owned banks shows 
that very often the direct allocation of credit follows non-economic criteria. When this is the case, 
the rent-seeking efforts of pressure groups negatively influence what should be the purely technical 
decision of granting loans. In contrast, second-tier financial organizations could accept the 
technically-based decisions of commercial banks in the granting of loans ifthe banks keep enough 
of the credit risk (Maydon, 1994). If the banks take an important share of the credit risk, they will 
base their decisions on an strict evaluation of creditworthiness. This frequently does not happen 
when the state-owned banks engage in retail lending. Apex organizations are thus a good option for 
governments that are retreating from the retailing level. 
According to these views, government-sponsored apex organizations can effectively induce 
private commercial banks to lend for productive activities considered to be of importance for 
economic development. This is the second rationale for the existence of financial apex organizations. 
Mexican experts argue that the role of the commercial banks is restricted to allocating funds 
discounted by the apex to the best borrowers within the target group. Even more, the private banks 
benefit from this role because, by diversifying their loan portfolio, they are able to reduce their 
7 Numerous evaluations have assessed the performance of the Mexican Fondos. One of the 
earlier evaluations of FIRA discussed the determinants of the profitability for a private 
commercial bank of discounting loans with the apex organization (Gonzalez-Vega, 1975). 
Experimentation with rediscount rates and rediscounting ratios was being used to encourage 
private banks to fund a greater share of the portfolio with their own resources, with very 
limited success. This failure was attributed by the authorities to the "conservative attitude" 
of the banks. The paper demonstrated that the banks were simply choosing the most 
profitable of the options offered to them. 
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overall risk (Maydon, 1994). The apex mechanism can then be successfully used to encourage the 
downscaling of banks toward difficult clienteles. 
Apex organizations have been extolled by government officials as efficient instruments to 
induce commercial banks into new areas of economic activity (Solis, 1970). These experts 
emphasize that rather than competing for borrowers with the commercial banks, as the state-owned 
banks do, the apex organizations are complementary of the private banks. 
Government officials also argue that state intervention in credit markets is optimized through 
the operation of apex organizations. By discounting loans, the second-tier organizations have 
indirect access to the infrastructure of the commercial banking system. There is no need for the 
installation of branches or the support of large bureaucratic entities as in the case of the state-owned 
banks. Furthermore, the decisions to grant loans are taken by experienced private bank officials, who 
have the best available information about the potential borrowers (Maydon, 1994). 
Mexican government officials have argued that effective state intervention in the allocation 
of credit was not possible during the previous stages of economic development. The initial phase 
of direct intervention allowed the commercial banks, however, to collect a better set of information 
on the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. 
These officials also argue that state intervention in financial markets is still required for a 
number of reasons. 8 First, there are sectors of economic activity that the commercial banks regard 
as non-profitable. Microenterprises fit this category. Second, apex organizations are instruments to 
promote competition among commercial banks and to avoid "excessive" economic rents for the 
banks. This is accomplished through disbursements of the available resources to those commercial 
banks that offer the best conditions in terms of financial margin or market outreach (Maydon, 1994). 
Bidding for these funds contributes to the elimination of those rents. 
8 As indicated earlier, the paper reports on the arguments advanced by the authorities, as an 
important element in describing the evolution of the Mexican apex organizations, but the 
validity of these arguments is not evaluated here. It is interesting to note, however, that most 
of the arguments for apex organizations are made in comparison to the retailing state-owned 
banks, whose unsuccessful performance and the high social costs of their operations have 
been amply documented and recognized by the authorities. These experts fail to see, 
nevertheless, that the apex organizations suffer from many of the same shortcomings of 
organizational design as the state-owned banks. 
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Micro.finance apex organizations in Mexico 
The creation of employment has been the main criterion of outreach for the operation of the 
apex organizations that have served the small and microenterprise sector. To pursue this goal, these 
financial organizations have assisted enterprises characterized as being labor-intensive. Pursuit of 
this goal has led the apex organizations to incorporate not-so-large enterprises in their portfolios. 
Small and microenterprises, however, contribute significantly to employment. As an illustration of 
the relevance of the target sector in the demand for labor, in the 1988-1993 period, small firms (those 
with 1to100 workers) contributed to the creation of 59 percent of the total of new jobs, medium-size 
enterprises (101 to 300 workers) contributed with 16 percent, and large firms (more than 300 
workers) contributed with 25 percent of total employment (Ruiz, 1995). 
The revelation of the importance of the non-large enterprise sector led government officials 
during the 1991-94 period to enact the National Program for the Modernization and Development 
of Micro, Small, and Medium-Size Industrial Enterprises (Programa para la Modernizaci6n y 
Desarrollo de la lndustria Micro, Pequena y Mediana). The financial component of this plan confers 
NAFIN the protagonic role in the distribution of resources to non-large firms. The plan also 
encourages NAFIN to find new alternatives to respond to the financial demands of microenterprises. 
NAFIN's clientele at the second-tier level is composed of commercial banks, credit unions, 
promotion entities (entidades de fomento), trust funds (jideicomisos), and leasing and factoring 
companies. Almost 90 percent ofNAFIN's total discounting is made through commercial banks, 
while the share of credit unions and promotion entities is only 8 percent of the total. The remaining 
is distributed among the rest of these financial organizations. 
A concise description of the major financial apex organizations that have reached the 
microenterprise sector follows. 
FOGAIN 
The Guarantee and Development Fund for Small and Medium Industry (FOGAIN) was 
created in 1953. This development fund was one of the first of its kind in Latin America, and its 
purpose was to assist the development of a labor-intensive industrial sector. Over the 20 years 
following its creation, however, the role of this fund was marginal. It was not until the president 
Echeverria (1970-1976) and Lopez Portillo (1976-82) administrations that the role ofFOGAIN was 
strengthened. From 1972 to 1976, for instance, in real pesos the amount ofloans authorized rose by 
19 percent and the number of loans rose by 72 percent (Ramirez, 1985). 
Some available figures suggest that FOGAIN was reaching smaller firms during that period. 
The average size ofloan in real terms decreased during the period from 257,000 to 177,000 pesos 
per firm. In addition, firms with less than 50 employees represented 81 percent of the total number 
of clients ofFOGAIN (Ramirez, 1985). 
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NAFIN 
With the recent restructuring of the development banking system, FOGAIN and other similar 
programs related to the development of non-large firms were appended to NAFIN. NAFIN's policy 
regarding the small and microenterprise sector has been unclear. The programs directed to this sector 
have been modified numerous times. Some of the relevant dimensions of these programs are the 
Micro and Small Enterprise Promotion Fund (Programa de Apoyo a la Micro y Pequefza Empresa) 
and the Microindustry Trust Fund. Currently, the attention of small and microenterprises is included 
in the main institutional program ofNAFIN through its Second-Tier Operations Program (Programa 
de Operaciones de Credito de Segundo Piso).9 Table 7 reports on the definitions of enterprise 
classes by size. 
Table 7. NAFIN: Definitions of micro, small, medium, and large enterprises 
Enterprise size By the number of employees By annual total sales 
Micro 
Small 
Up to 15 
16 -- 100 
Medium 101 -- 250 
Large 250 or more 
(thousands of dollars)a 
Up to 180 
181 -- 1,807 
1,808 -- 4,096 
4,097 or more 
a Given an exchange rate of 8.30 pesos per U.S. Dollar. 
Source: NAFIN. 
Savings and loan societies (SAPs) and credit cooperatives have requested that the financial 
authorities include them among NAFIN's clientele. This has not happened. On the one hand, the 
internal rules ofNAFIN ban operations with non-formal organizations such as credit cooperatives. 
On the other hand, although the SAPs are formal financial organizations, they have been excluded 
because their loan activity is tied to the amount of savings collected among their members. External 
financing, in this case through NAFIN resources, could negatively affect the incentives that they 
have to increase the mobilization of internal savings. 
In its apex functions, NAFIN has not been able to reach the microenterprise sector much. As 
Table 8 indicates, since 1990 the shares of the total disbursements of loans to small and micro-
enterprises have decreased. A number of factors may explain this phenomenon. First, from 1982 to 
9 The name of this program was changed recently. Its previous name was Single Financing 
Program for Industrial Modernization (Programa Unico de Financiamiento a la 
Modernizaci6n Industrial or PRO MIN). The decision of the NAFIN authorities to rename 
FOMIN was taken as a signal that non-industrial activities can also be considered for the 
disbursements of funds. The NAFIN authorities have added that the new name of their main 
institutional program helps to emphasize the simultaneous existence of first-tier operations 
with its apex activities. 
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1989, the commercial banks were under the control of the government. 10 During this period, the 
allocation of the available loanable funds did not follow strict economic criteria. After 1989, the 
influence of government officials in the distribution of loans decreased substantially. The hypothesis 
is that the privatized banks have perceived the financing of microenterprises as a non-profitable or 
comparatively less profitable business. 
A second factor that helps to explain the smaller participation of microenterprises in the total 
allocation of NAFIN credit is related to the lending technology of commercial banks. In effect, bank 
criteria to grant loans are based on the requirement of collateral and the analysis of financial state-
ments. These requirements are fulfilled by a minimum number of microenterprises (NAFIN, 1997). 
Table 8. NAFIN: Disbursement of credit by enterprise size, 1990-1997 (percentages 
and thousands of Pesos) 
Enterprise size Total amount 
Year Micro Small Medium Large 
1990 11.9 48.7 18.9 20.5 2,829,935 
1991 15.5 57.6 8.1 18.8 12,232,175 
1992 18.3 52.2 7.9 21.6 23,320,686 
1993 19.9 55.4 6.1 18.7 34,879,642 
1994 18.7 52.7 8.7 19.8 49,917,560 
1995 7.0 15.8 12.5 64.8 10,433,517 
1996 5.4 16.3 13.0 65.3 12,736,696 
1997 5.9 22.5 15.7 55.9 6,319,739 
Source: NAFIN. 
v. New Microfinance Programs 
The Global Microenterprise Development Program (PGDM) 
The revelation of the potential of the microenterprise sector as an employer has led to the 
design of two new micro finance programs supported by the Government of Mexico and The World 
Bank. The first one is being designed by NAFIN officials. It is called the Global Microenterprise 
Development Program (Programa Global para el Desarrollo de la Microempresa or PGDM). 
A pilot program will be implemented at the beginning of 1998, and it will include some non-
government organizations operating in the central region of the country. Initially, NAFIN will 
10 In 1982, president Lopez Portillo nationalized the domestic commercial banks. The banks 
were privatized in 1989. 
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operate at the first-tier level, but it is planned that later on NAFIN will limit its intervention just to 
that of a microfinance apex mechanism (see Box 1 ). 
Box 1 
Global Microenterprise Development Program (PGDM) 
1. Objective 
To promote and assist the development of microenterprises, so that they are able: 
(a) to access the institutional entrepreneurial support system (sistema institutional de 
respaldo empresarial), and 
(b) to participate in the formal sector of the economy based on their own 
competitiveness. 
2. Principles 
(a) Assistance-based criteria are rejected. Microenterprises should reach levels of 
efficiency and competitiveness similar to those of other foreign and domestic 
firms. 
(b) The development of microenterprises requires non-financial support, such as 
organizational and technical assistance. 
( c) The main problem of microenterprises is their self-sufficiency. Microenterprises 
can improve their performance by banding together. In this way, they will be able 
to reach both scope and scale economies. 
3. Structure and mechanics of operation 
Step 1. Entities of growth promotion (EGPs) are created by NAFIN. The EGPs are composed by 
NAFIN, microfinance NGOs, and state and municipal governments. NAFIN intervenes 
at the first-tier level. The EGP evaluates and authorizes the microenterprise's loan 
application, and NAFIN grants the loans directly to the microenterprise. The microfinance 
NGO collects payments on the loan on behalf ofNAFIN. NAFIN places these payments 
in a reserve fund managed by the EGP (Fondo de Contingenciay Desarrollo). 
Step 2. Same structure as in Step 1. The main difference is that NAFIN intervenes at the second-
tier level. The microfinance NGO keeps an intermediation margin on the loan operations. 
NAFIN adds a share of the total loan payments to the reserve fund. This share is labeled 
as a contribution of the microenterprise sector. 
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The main objective of the PGDP is to "promote and support the development of micro-
enterprises, so that they will be able to access the formal financial system" (NAFIN, 1997). This task 
is attempted in two steps. In the first step, several entities of growth promotion ( entidades de 
fomento) will be created. These entities will be formed by microfinance NGOs, state and municipal 
governments, the microenterprise clientele, and NAFIN. Each one of these partners will contribute 
to the total initial capital. 
At the beginning of the program, NAFIN will be the main source of funds for the loans 
disbursed to the borrowers selected by the microfinance NGO. The capital of the entities is supposed 
to increase pari pasu with repayments. For a certain period, not yet determined, all loan repayments 
will be added to the capital of the entities. The function of the entities, however, is not restricted to 
granting loans, but it also includes technical assistance provided by external advisors. 
In the second step of the PGDM, NAFIN will restrict its participation to a second-tier 
function. In the most favorable scenario, it is expected that 30 entities of growth promotion will be 
operating around the country in the next three years. For this purpose, the elaboration of a 
comprehensive inventory of microfinance organizations is in progress. This inventory is supposed 
to help in the determination of the financial health of the participating micro finance organizations. 
The PGDM is attractive because some of its elements are associated with the sustainability 
of this kind of a program. One of such elements is to respect both the selection of borrowers and the 
determination of the elements of the credit contracts by the microfinance organizations. This 
includes decisions on loan interest rates and on credit technologies. The program is not 
interventionist from this perspective. 
Another important element in favor of the PGDM is expressed in its mission. In contrast with 
previous programs, the criterion for success of the program is related to the accessibility to credit 
for microenterprises and it is no longer related to the number of jobs generated or to the number of 
persons reached by the program. 
Some potential problems are likely to emerge, however, in the operation of the program. One 
of such problems is related to the participation of the state and municipal governments. Prior 
experience indicates that political intervention is an element that can easily distort the purpose of any 
financial entity. Another potential problem is the sustainability of the program. NAFIN officials 
argue that their direct participation will end as soon as possible. The indirect role ofNAFIN as a 
financial apex, in turn, will be determined on the basis of the financial health of the entities. If this 
commitment is believed by the NGOs, the greater will be the likelihood that the program will not 
end in a few years. Given past experiences in Mexico, however, the credibility of this threat will be 
hard to establish. 
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Rural Bank Branches Program 
The second microfinance program in progress was designed by officials at the Ministry of 
Finance, the Central Bank, and The World Bank. In the initial stage, this program is providing a 
subsidy to commercial banks that set up branches in rural areas (Werner, 1997). The short-run 
objective of this program is to promote the opening of200 branches in rural municipalities. Rural 
municipalities are defined as having less than 20,000 inhabitants. Although the program was 
supposed to start at the beginning of this year, a number of problems have delayed its implemen-
tation. One of the main problems is that the representatives of the commercial banks and government 
officials have disagreed with respect to the target municipalities. 
A second stage of the RBBP will provide technical and informational assistance to the 
commercial banks involved in the program. The rationale for this stage rests on the assumption that 
private banks cannot "see that [rural banking] is a profitable business" (Werner, 1997, p. 10). For 
this purpose, officials at FOCIR (a trust fund that provides risk capital to rural firms) are developing 
a broad system of information on the profitability of a wide variety of agribusiness activities. FOCIR 
officials argue that this information will provide the banks with the main criteria to evaluate potential 
borrowers. The success of these efforts is yet to be seen. 
VII. Lessons and Conclusions 
Good intentions are not enough 
Earlier, good intentions might have led government officials to intervene in credit markets. 
Numerous mechanisms to offer cheap credit were identified as potentially powerful instruments to 
promote investment in agriculture and manufacturing (Solis, 1971). Furthermore, cheap credit 
programs were attractive to policymakers for a number of reasons. Some of the reasons are that these 
programs are easy to implement and that they are always welcome by the potential beneficiaries. 
That subsidized credit programs appear to generate results in a short period of time is another 
reason for the popularity of these interventions among policymakers. Usually, government officials 
are evaluated on a short-term basis, so they are likely to pursue policies that promise immediate 
results. In the long run they may be no longer in office. 
State intervention in financial markets, however, has brought undesirable results. Even 
Mexican government officials recognize that rent-seeking and fraud plagues most of these credit 
programs. Even more, the sustainability of such programs is jeopardized always by high rate of non-
performing loans. 
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Political factors are not absent in apex organizations 
Apex organizations were supposed to ameliorate problems of rent-seeking and fraud because 
the selection of borrowers is made by private financial intermediaries. The experience of the 
Mexican apex organizations seems to contradict this view. Political factors have not been eliminated 
in the allocation ofloanable funds through the apex organizations. In particular, the growth first and 
then debacle of the credit unions (uniones de credito) illustrates the pernicious effects of political 
influence in financial matters. 
Apex organizations are not well-suited to promote the microfinance sector 
One argument in favor of apex organizations is that they can induce commercial banks into 
unknown markets, such as the microenterprise sector. The Mexican experience shows, however, that 
this is not necessarily the case. The bulk of the resources discounted by the apex organizations has 
been allocated to medium-size firms. This is explained by the criterion of outreach for most credit 
programs: employment. The new microfinance programs, in turn, are being designed to reach the 
microfinance sector. The future of these programs, however, will be determined by the commitment 
of the government to step down once the microfinance organizations reach a minimum degree of 
self-sufficiency. 
No financial apex organization has been responsible for the growth of a dynamic 
microfinance sector in Mexico 
A number of commercial banks and NGOs are making technological improvements to reach 
the microenterprise sector. They constitute the dynamic portion of this market niche. Neither the 
financial apex organizations nor the state-owned banks have been responsible for this phenomena. 
Several demand factors, such as the growth of the microenterprise sector and the requirements of 
immigrant Mexican workers to transfer funds, help explain much of this expansion. The most 
important initiatives in response to this expansion of the demand for services have come from the 
private sector and have had nothing to do with apex mechanisms. Government intervention may 
actually derail these important initiatives. 
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